Two Indian technology industry associations have urged the Union Government to overhaul the country’s cybersecurity policy and create a national directory of indigenous security products, warning that growing AI-powered threats and recent global technology outages have exposed serious risks in digital infrastructure.
The Telecom Equipment Manufacturers Association of India (TEMA) and the Cyber Security Association of India (CSAI) have called for a new policy to replace or substantially update the National Cyber Security Policy, 2013.
In recommendations reported on November 22, the associations said India’s increasing dependence on foreign technology providers and a limited number of vendors could leave essential digital services vulnerable to widespread disruption.
They have also offered to develop a comprehensive database of Indian-made cybersecurity products, telecom equipment and related services, making it easier for organisations to identify domestic alternatives.
The proposals form part of the associations’ pre-Budget recommendations. They have not yet been adopted as government policy.
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Industry Bodies Warn Against Dependence On Foreign Technology Providers
The two associations argue that India’s digital infrastructure has become increasingly interconnected, with banking, telecommunications, government services and businesses relying on technology supplied by multiple companies.
This dependence can create problems when a widely used software provider experiences an outage or security failure.
A disruption at one technology company may affect numerous organisations simultaneously, even when those organisations maintain their own security arrangements.
NK Goyal, Chairman Emeritus of TEMA and President of CSAI, said India needs a comprehensive directory identifying domestic cybersecurity and telecommunications solutions.
Such a database would help organisations looking specifically for Indian technology suppliers.
Goyal said the associations were seeking non-financial government support to develop the directory rather than requesting direct funding.
The proposed database could include locally developed cybersecurity software, telecom equipment and specialised technical services.
However, neither association has announced a launch date, detailed eligibility criteria or an independent certification mechanism for products included in the proposed directory.
The industry bodies also want government procurement policies to give greater consideration to trusted Indian solutions.
Why AI-Powered Cyberattacks Have Increased Pressure For Policy Reform
The associations warned that cybercrime has become increasingly organised, with sophisticated hacking services available through subscription-based arrangements.
Their pre-Budget memorandum highlighted the commercial trade in stolen identities, malicious software, payment-card information and access to compromised computer networks.
Such services can make advanced cybercrime capabilities accessible to criminals without extensive technical expertise.
Artificial intelligence creates another challenge by helping attackers analyse software, identify weaknesses and automate parts of malicious operations.
However, AI does not make every cyberattack successful, nor does its use establish that recent technology outages were caused by hackers.
The associations cited disruptions affecting international airlines, banks and healthcare services as evidence of the risks associated with interconnected digital infrastructure.
Independent reporting on recent global outages has also highlighted ageing technology, software faults and pressure to deploy security updates quickly.
These incidents demonstrate that major disruptions can arise from technical failures as well as deliberate attacks.
The distinction matters because cybersecurity policy must address both malicious activity and failures that interrupt essential services.
What Is Technology Sovereignty And Why Does It Matter?
Technology sovereignty refers to a country’s ability to maintain meaningful control over important digital systems, including the technology, information and infrastructure on which those systems depend.
For example, an organisation relying entirely on one overseas cybersecurity provider may face difficulties if that provider experiences an outage or withdraws support.
Having alternative suppliers can reduce this dependence and improve operational flexibility.
However, using domestically developed technology does not automatically make a system secure.
Security also depends on independent testing, reliable software updates, technical compatibility and the ability to respond to vulnerabilities.
TEMA and CSAI have therefore recommended greater emphasis on field validation and interoperability when evaluating cybersecurity products.
Field validation means checking whether technology works effectively under real operating conditions.
Interoperability refers to the ability of different systems to function together without creating unnecessary technical barriers.
The associations also want public procurement decisions to consider product quality rather than relying heavily on suppliers’ previous government contracts.
Proposed Overhaul Builds On India’s Existing Cybersecurity Framework
India’s National Cyber Security Policy was introduced in 2013, before today’s widespread use of AI agents and many modern cloud-based systems.
The country has subsequently developed additional cybersecurity measures, including CERT-In incident-reporting requirements and sector-specific security directions.
More recently, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India released draft guidelines addressing responsible AI use in telecommunications, including incident monitoring and governance responsibilities.
These developments show that cybersecurity regulation has continued evolving, although the industry’s latest proposal calls for a broader national policy update.
TEMA and CSAI want stronger coordination during cyber incidents, greater recognition of domestic security products and procurement processes that encourage technically reliable alternatives.
Their recommendations have not resulted in a newly notified national cybersecurity policy or a government-approved sovereign technology database.
The next significant development will be whether the Union Government incorporates these suggestions into future policy consultations, procurement rules or Budget-related decisions.
Businesses and public institutions should avoid relying entirely on one technology supplier for critical services. Review backup arrangements, test recovery procedures and assess cybersecurity products on independently demonstrated security and reliability.
