On a Monday morning announcement that offered few details but carried unmistakable weight, the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court confirmed the execution of four individuals convicted of running scam and gambling operations out of Myanmar. The court said the network had defrauded victims of more than 29 billion yuan—roughly $4.2 billion—and was directly responsible for the deaths of six Chinese citizens.
The defendants, according to court statements, had operated from industrial-style compounds in Myanmar’s Kokang region, along the porous border with China. From there, they allegedly oversaw telecom and online scams that targeted victims across Asia and beyond, while also running casinos and gambling rings that laundered illicit proceeds.
Chinese courts described the crimes as “exceptionally heinous,” citing not only the scale of financial losses but the human toll: abductions, coercion, forced prostitution and links to drug manufacturing and trafficking. Appeals were rejected by the Guangdong Provincial High People’s Court, clearing the way for the executions.
Scam Parks as an Industry
The case is not an isolated one. Just days earlier, Chinese authorities had announced death sentences for 11 other individuals convicted of operating scam centres in Myanmar. Together, the rulings underscore Beijing’s determination to frame cross-border fraud as a threat to national security and social stability, not merely as financial crime.
Over the past decade, scam parks across Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos have evolved into a shadow industry. These compounds—often guarded and fenced like factories—house thousands of workers who carry out online fraud, romance scams, investment schemes and illegal gambling operations around the clock.
Investigators and rights groups say the workforce is a mix of willing participants and trafficked victims, many lured by promises of legitimate employment and later trapped through violence, debt bondage or threats. Experts estimate that thousands of Chinese nationals have been ensnared in such operations, either as victims of scams or as coerced labor.
Beijing’s Broader Crackdown
China’s response has grown sharper over the past year. The executions form part of a wider crackdown that includes mass arrests, cross-border policing agreements and sustained diplomatic pressure on neighboring governments. In October, Myanmar authorities—under intense lobbying from Beijing—arrested more than 2,000 people during a raid on KK Park, one of the region’s most notorious scam hubs near the Thai border.
Chinese officials have framed these efforts as necessary to dismantle criminal syndicates that prey on Chinese citizens and undermine regional stability. Courts have emphasized deterrence, sending a message that organizers and financiers of such operations will face the harshest possible punishment.
Yet analysts note that many of the scam centres are allegedly run by Chinese-led criminal groups operating in partnership with local militias and armed factions, exploiting Myanmar’s ongoing civil conflict and weak governance. That reality complicates enforcement and raises questions about how much of the industry can truly be dismantled.
Pressure on Myanmar—and Limits of Enforcement
Myanmar’s military government has long been accused of turning a blind eye to scam centres operating within its borders. While authorities now tout raids and arrests, some monitors describe these actions as selective and, at times, symbolic—designed to ease pressure from Beijing without fundamentally disrupting the revenue streams that benefit powerful local actors.
The United States and other countries have also voiced concern about the proliferation of scam operations, which increasingly target victims far beyond China. But Beijing’s approach stands out for its severity, reflecting both domestic anger over mounting losses and a broader assertion of state authority over transnational crime.
For now, China’s executions mark a grim escalation in the fight against Southeast Asia’s scam economy. Whether they will meaningfully weaken an industry built on instability, corruption and cross-border complicity remains an open question—one that extends far beyond the courtroom in Shenzhen.
