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The advanced persistent threat group known as DoNot Team (aka APT‑C‑35, Mint Tempest, Origami Elephant) has moved beyond South Asia to target a European foreign affairs ministry using its signature LoptikMod malware, according to Trellix Advanced Research Centre. This marks the first recorded deployment of their custom spyware in a high-level diplomatic espionage campaign in Europe.
Attackers delivered the malware via a spear-phishing email purporting to come from a defence attaché, complete with polished HTML formatting and correct accents (e.g., “Attaché”). The email prompted recipients to follow a Google Drive link that downloaded a password‑protected RAR archive. Inside was a disguised executable masquerading as a PDF. Once activated, it launched LoptikMod—a remote‑access trojan capable of persistence via scheduled tasks, anti‑virtual-machine checks, and encrypted communication with a command‑and‑control server.
Stealth Tactics and Diplomatic Espionage Emerge
Trellix noted that the attack demonstrates several levels of sophistication: the malware avoids running in virtual environments, obfuscates its code, and ensures only a single instance runs, minimising detection. The inactive C2 server suggests the hackers have pivoted infrastructure post-infection, complicating forensic response.
DoNot APT has actively targeted South Asian governments since 2016, including telecom systems in Norway and the U.K. Now, their focus expands to intercept diplomatic communications, presumably to gain insight into Europe–South Asia geopolitical affairs. Trellix describes this as a clear escalation, indicating well-resourced sponsorship and strategic intent.
What’s at Stake and How to Defend
Diplomatic Espionage in Plain Sight
This incident illustrates that APT groups are no longer confined by geography; their attacks now exploit trusted communication channels—like Google Drive and Gmail—to penetrate government systems. The use of realistic spear‑phishing themes makes detection difficult until significant damage is done.
Building Diplomatic Air‑Gaps
Security experts recommend that foreign ministries adopt tighter email authentication (DKIM/SPF/DMARC), enforce multi-factor verification on archive downloads, sandbox suspicious attachments, and maintain active threat hunting in outbound communications.
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What Comes Next?
Europe’s affected diplomatic entity is assessing data loss. Trellix and regional CERTs are working with cybersecurity teams to trace malware within networks and monitor dark‑web chatter for stolen diplomatic intelligence. Intelligence services are engaged, and DoNot APT’s next move may target more nations.
This alert reinforces a stark message: cognitive trust in email is no shield, especially when dealing with cyber espionage actors blending technical stealth with diplomatic cunning.
About the Author – Sahhil Taware is a B.Sc. LL.B. (Hons.) student at National Forensic Sciences University, Gandhinagar, with a keen interest in corporate law and tech-driven legal change.
